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The "Attractive Nuisance Doctrine"
in Virginia
Wmm&x T. MusE,
Children deem it their prerogative to roam wherever
they please. In particular, they have a tendency to
wander on other people's land and meddle with anything
they find there. In doing so they frequently get hurt. The
problem of the liability of occupiers of land for such in-
juries has taken up much of the time of American
courts in the last one hundred years and has resalted in
many published decisions. The trial courts in Virginia
have devoted much thought and time to this problem, and
since 1887 twelve cases have been heard and decided by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. It is the pur-
pose of this article to review the present state of the Vir-
ginia law as to that liability.
As to an adult trespasser who is injured by conditions
(not activities) on the land of another, the general rule
that the occupier of land is under no liability to the tres-
passer is uniformly agreed upon by the courts. It is said
that he is a wrongdoer and that he has no right to de-
mand that the land be made safe for his trespass. He is
mature enough to be able to look out for himself as to all
ordinary visible conditions, and to make his own decision
to take his chances against latent dangers. He assumes
the risk. Both in England and America, whose societies
are based on the private ownership of property, it has
been considered for centuries a socially desirable policy
to allow a man to use the land he occupies in his own way,
without requiring him to assume the burden of protect-
ing intruders who come there without privilege or right.
There are three recognized exceptions to the general
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rule of non-liability of the land-occupier to an adult
trespasser. Where, to the knowledge of the occupier,
there are frequent trespasses upon a small area of his
land he owes a duty to use reasonable care to make con-
ditions safe for the intruders. Also, where the occupier
sees the trespasser about to encounter a latent danger-
ous condition, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care
to warn him. In the third place, the occupier will be sub-
ject to liability to a traveler on the public highway who
inadvertently or intentionally deviates from the high-
way and is injured by a negligently maintained condi-
tion on the land. Of course, all three of these exceptions
apply to trespassing children as well as to adults. Should
the general rule ever be applied to trespassing children?
Where the trespasser is a child, the reason for the
general rule does not exist. He is immature and lacks
capacity for sound judgment. He may not be capable of
protecting himself against conditions which he sees or
of making intelligent decisions as to what chances he will
take. The assumption of risk does not seem to apply to
the immature child with the same force and validity
with which it applies to the mature adult. Too, the law
has always recognized the added social interest in the
safety and welfare of children. While it is the duty of
the parents of a child to look after his safety, it is neither
customary nor practical to follow the child around every-
where he goes or to confine him in the house or in a
fenced yard. If the child is to be adequately protected,
the one who can do it best and with the least inconveni-
ence is the occupier of the land upon which he plays.
Any duty thus imposed on the land-occupier must not be
unlimited, for two reasons. Parents should not be en-
couraged to shed all responsibility for the safety of their
children. Furthermore, the burden of making land safe
for a child is no less than in the case of an adult, and the
law should not place an unreasonable burden on the land-
occupier to look out for other people's children. The de-
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cisions show an effort to reach a compromise between
the social interest in the safety of children and the social
interest in the ownership and free use of land for the
owner's own purposes. No court gives the child complete
protection; all courts afford him some greater degree of
protection than is given to an adult.
The present state of the American law is accurately
set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoxD), TORTS §339
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960), as follows:
§339. CONDITIONS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO
TRESPASSING CHILDREN.
A possesser of land is subject to liability for phy-
sical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by
a structure or other artificial condition upon the
land, if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one
upon which the possessor knows or has reason to
know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor
knows or has reason to know and which he realizes
or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk
of death or serious bodily harm to such children,
and
(c) the children because of their youth do not
discover the condition or realize the risk involved
in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility of the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with
the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care
to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the
children.
The special rule, of which the above is a restatement,
came to be known as the "attractive nuisance -doc-
trine." This was an unfortunate misnomer. It is not a
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"doctrine." The condition which causes the injury is
not a "nuisance," nor need it be "attractive" to chil-
dren. This name has been a deterrent to the adoption of
the rule in some courts. The special rule merely means
that child trespasser law is just ordinary negligence law
and the fact of trespass is only one of the factors to be
taken into account in determining the defendant's duty,
and the care required of him; the fact of trespass does
not mean that the child's recovery is barred.
At the present time the attractive nuisance doctrine
is the overwhelming weight of authority in America.
Less than 10 of the 51 jurisdictions refuse to follow it.
What of Virginia! The cases are inconclusive. In spite of
the fact that on at least two occasions the court has
expressly repudiated the doctrine, none of the Virginia
cases is out of accord with it.
The doctrine was first mentioned in Clark v. City of
Richmond, 83 Va. 355, 5 S. E. 369 (1887), which accu-
rately stated the doctrine in some detail but held it in-
applicable to the facts of that case. The city had ex-
cavated on another's land near the public sidewalk, and
a boy six years old got upon a brick wall two feet high
and fifteen inches wide, which guarded the excavation,
and in an attempt to walk the wall fell into the excava-
tion and was injured.
Lynchburq Tel. Co. v. Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S. E.
148 (1905), was the first case presenting facts to which
the doctrine applies. The land-occupier was held liable
to the trespassing child, but the decision was not ex-
pressly based on the doctrine. Without citing authority
the court said:
In legal contemplation it may be that any un-
authorized entry upon the premises of another
whose title extends to the centre of the earth, down-
ward, and without limit upward, by putting one's
hand through or over a boundary fence, is a tres-
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pass. It would, however, certainly seem that the
trespass had reached its vanishing point when such
a trespass was committed by a child eight years of
age. (103 Va. at 608, 50 S.E. at 152)
The result is in complete accord with the attractive nuis-
ance doctrine. The court avoided the use of the doctrine
on the doubtful ground that, on these particular facts,
the trespassing child would not be considered a tres-
passer.
In Walker's Adm'r v. Potomac, F. & P. R. R., 105 Va.
226, 53 S. E. 113 (1906), the court expressly repudiated
the attractive nuisance doctrine in holding the land-oc-
cupier not subject to liability to a trespassing child,
twelve years old, who was injured on an unfastened and
unenclosed turnable. The doctrine had its inception in
America in the case of Sioux City & Pac. R. R. v. Stout,
84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1873), where re-
covery was allowed when a child trespassed on the rail-
road's land and was injured while playing with a turn-
table. In refusing to follow Sioux- City, the Virginia
court declined to apply the doctrine to the most orthodox
facts to which the doctrine might be applied. In Walker
the railroad knew that children constantly intruded and
played on file turntable. This knowledge on the part of
the railroad made the first exception to the general rule
of non-liability stated above applicable. There could have
been liability under either that rule or the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The court apparently overlooked the
former and refused to follow the latter.
The next case to arise in Virginia was Lunisford's
Adm'r v. Colonial Coal & Coke Co., 115 Va. 346, 79 S. E.
348 (1913). Here a child, three years of age, trespassed
five feet from a commonly used path across railroad
tracks and began to play with a broken and dangling
electric wire of the defendant's by touching it against
the iron rail and making flashes. The child was injured
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when her clothing was ignited by a flash of fire. The
court held the injury was unforeseeable and therefore
the railroad was not negligent. Having thus disposed of
the case, the opinion further stated, however, on the au-
thority of Walker, that the land-occupier owned no duty
to the child trespasser, thereby applying to children the
general rule applicable to adults.
A decade elapsed before the court had an opportunity
again to express itself on this matter in Haywood v.
South Hill Mfg. Co., 142 Va. 761, 128 S. E. 362 (1925).
On authority of Lynchburg, the court held the land-
occupier liable to an eleven-year-old child who was in-
jured when he thrust a piece of an old saw through a
wire fence enclosing a high-voltage electric transformer
and touched the transformer, even if he were a tres-
passer at the time. The result, again, is in accord with
the attractive nuisance doctrine, and the opinion be-
speaks the very same policy considerations as are back
of the doctrine. Although the case presented facts to
which the rule of liability to constant trespassers upon
a limited area, the rule of liability to trespassers de-
viating from an adjacent highway, and the rule of liabil-
ity to trespassing children (i.e., the attractive nuisance
doctrine) were applicable, the decision does not seem to
be based on any of them. All of these are exceptions to
the general rule of non-liability to trespassers. The court
said:
While it is true, as a general proposition, that the
owner of land owes no duty of prevision to tres-
passers, there are exceptions to the rule as well rec-
ognized as the rule itself. A mere technical trespass
as in this case.., or as in the case of Lynchburg Tel.
Co. v. Booker, supra, are examples. (142 Va. at 766,
128 S.E. at 364)
The next two cases contain dicta repudiating the at-
tractive nuisance doctrine: Morris v. Peyton, 148 Va.
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812, 822, 139 S. E. 500, 503 (1927), (thirteen-year-old boy
riding on running board of truck found not to be a tres-
passer); Filer v. McNair, 158 Va. 88, 93, 163 S. E. 335,
337 (1932), (child, eight years old, found not to be tres-
passing when he was injured by being caught in the
ringer of a washing machine being demonstrated by de-
fendant). Cf. also Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 95 S. E.
394 (1918).
In Rieder v. Garfield Manor Corp., 164 Va. 192, 178
S. E. 667 (1935), a seven-year-old boy trespassed into de-
fendant's tool house and took therefrom several dyna-
mite caps one of which exploded and injured him when
he later picked it with a knife. The trial court's ruling in
striking out all the plaintiff's evidence was affirmed on
appeal. The entire opinion was devoted to showing that
the land-occupier was not negligent. If it is to be in-
ferred from the pains the court took to find there was no
negligence that it thought the land-occupier owed a duty
to use care for the safety of the trespassing child of
tender years, the opinion gives no indication whether
that duty is imposed by the attractive nuisance doctrine
or the rule applicable to constant trespassers upon a
limited area, both of which were applicable to the facts.
Daugherty v. Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S. E. 2d 119
(1940), is the key case in determining what the Vir-
ginia law is in this area. The plaintiff, a child eight years
of age, in company with several other children, went into
the defendant's tool house through an open door and,
upon leaving, took several dynamite caps. Later the
plaintiff was picking at one of the caps with a pin when
it exploded causing injury to him. The facts were such
that only the general rule of no duty to use reasonable
care for the safety of trespassers, whether adults or chil-
dren, or the exception to this general rule, known as the
"attractive nuisance doctrine," applicable to trespassing
children of tender years, was applicable. The defendant
was held liable. The opinion avoided using the term "at-
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tractive nuisance" and conveniently ignored the former
opposed cases, but the language of the opinion precisely
describes the doctrine and its limitations. Note the fol-
lowing language which is in essence a statement of the
attractive nuisance doctrine:
There may be cases of trespassers who are not en-
titled to a recovery for injuries sustained from ex-
plosives while unlawfully on the premises of another
unless wantonly inflicted, but this rule has no ap-
plication where children of immature years are con-
cerned. The courts throw a safeguard around such
children to protect them in their childish instincts
from the dangerous nature of explosives of which
they have no proper understanding. This is espe-
cially true where the keeper of explosives knows, or
should know, that children of tender years play or
are likely to play around the storehouse. Liability
may exist where a child of tender years is involved
and not exist in the case of a child of more mature
years.
n .. If the one who keeps explosives is negligent
in leaving them in a place accessible to children
who he knows or should know are accustomed to
play nearby, the fact that the child is a trespasser
will not relieve the owner from liability. The same is
true of other dangerous instrumentalities. (175 Va.
at 75, 7 S.E. 2d at 120)
For Virginia authority, the court relied on the Hay-
wood and Lynchburg cases which held liability to the
trespassing children. It should be observed that the
Walker case, which expressly repudiated the attractive
nuisance doctrine and which had not been expressly over-
ruled, was ignored in the opinion, though cited and re-
lied on in the defendant's brief.
Lest the true meaning of this decision be doubted, the
non-Virginia authorities cited by the court in support of
its holding should be examined. Three authorities were
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relied on. One, Sedita v. Steinberg, 105 Conn. 1, 134 Ati.
243 (1926), was not in point since the child plaintiff was
not a trespasser. The court then cited the section of
American Jurisprudence which sets out the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The third authority was a leading
case, Smith v. Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P. 2d
785, 48 P. 2d 760 (on rehearing) (1935), which applied
the doctrine. In clarifying the first opinion in Smith the
Nevada court, on rehearing, recognized the division of
authority throughout the United States and expressly
chose the attractive nuisance doctrine. In doing so, all
of §339 of the Restatement of Torts (1934), which is an
authoritative statement of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine, and substantially all of Comment a to that section
were 'quoted.
The next case to reach the Court of Appeals, Dennis
v. Odend 'Hal-Monks Corp., 182 Va. 77, 28 S. E. 2d 4
(1943), was distinguished from Daugherty on its facts,
and was decided for the defendant. While repairing the
roof of a nearby building, the defendant parked his
truck at the curb on the street in close proximity to a
sand pile known by the defendant to be a favorite place
of play for the neighborhood children. Near the rear of
the truck, in plain view of the children, were left tools
and repair materials, including a Pepsi-Cola bottle, with
its original colorful label attached, containing muriatic
acid. The plaintiff, a three-year-old child, obtained pos-
session of the bottle and drank some of its contents and
as a result was seriously injured. The defendant was
held not liable on the theory "that such an event could
not be foreseen by even the most careful and prudent
person." Having decided that the injury was unforesee-
able and therefore the defendant was not negligent, it be-
came unnecessary to refer to the attractive nuisance doc-
trine. It is obvious, however, that the court considered
the defendant to be under a duty to the trespassing child.
If here had been no duty of care it would have been
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unnecessary for the court to discuss negligence, i.e., the
failure to exercise care. The existence of a duty to use
due care for the safety of trespassing children, which is
the attractive nuisance doctrine, was made clear when
the court closed its opinion by saying:
The defendant emphasized the fact that in this
case the child was a trespasser. We give little
thought to this in the case of a child of such im-
mature years. In fact we said in the Daugherty-
.Uippehen Case, supra, that the rule regarding tres-
passers has no application where children of im-
mature years are concerned. (182 Va. at 83, 28 S.E.
2d at 7)
Having in mind the only Virginia cases holding liabil-
ity to trespassing children, the court in Baecher v. Mc-
Farland, 183 Va. 1, 31 S. E. 2d 279 (1944) held that a
barbed-wire fence does not "attract children" as do
electric wires or dynamite caps. Thus, a five-year-old
trespassing child who, after climbing upon a fence, fell
and was injured when she came in contact with one of the
barbs was denied recovery.
In Town of Big Stone Gap v. Johnson, 184 Va. 375, 35
S. E. 2d 71 (1945), an eight-year-old boy was injured
while he and a playmate were playing on a road scraper
left after working hours near a playground area. The
plaintiff grounded his action on thp attractive nuisance
doctrine. In summarizing the doctrine the court said:
"The two necessary elements of the tort are that the
appliance is known to be attractive to children and
known to be dangerous to them." Then it proceeded to
hold that the defendant had no reason to think that the
road scraper would be attractive to children, nor was
there any proof that it was dangerous to children as is
true in the case of dynamite caps or moving machinery
such as a washing machine. The court did not repudiate
the doctrine, but held that the facts of this case did not
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meet its requirements. As an alternate ground of deci-
sion, the court found that the defendant was not guilty
of the degree of negligence required for recovery. Both
grounds of decision presuppose a duty to trespassing
children such as that imposed by the attractive nuisance
doctrine.
The most recent decision is Wa hwabaugh v. Northern
Va. Const. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S. E. 2d 276 (1948). In
conducting its business of quarrying rock, the defendant
maintained a large, unenclosed pit which stayed filled
with water of varying depths. The water being muddy,
it was impossible to distinguish the shallow from the
deep water. To the knowledge of the defendant, children
customarily swam, waded, and played in the pit. The
plaintiff, nine years old, while playing on a raft, fell off
and was drowned. In holding no liability, the court found
that the quarry was not the type of condition on land
to which the attractive nuisance doctrine applies. Al-
though the opinion did not expressly say so, a close
analysis leaves no doubt that Virginia has embraced the
attractive nuisance doctrine. The opinion expressly
treated the case as one involving the doctrine. After re-
ferring to the earlier Virginia cases, some of which held
in accord with the doctrine while others repudiated it,
the court said:
In order for the doctrine to apply, the danger of
the instrumentality must not only be hidden or la-
tent, but the instrumentality must be easily accessi-
ble to children and in a location where it is known
that children frequently gather. (157 Va. at 770, 48
S.E. 2d at 278)
The holding in Washabaugh that the danger was not
latent, and therefore the doctrine did not apply, is a
commonly accepted limitation on the doctrine of attrac-
tive nuisance. See RESTATEMENT (S.com1), TORTs §339
(d) and comment i (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960). In support
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of its decision for the defendant, the court cited and re-
lied on four authorities: (1) Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal.
345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896). The attractive nuisance doctrine
is well established in California. (2) Stendal v. Boyd, 73
Minn. 53, 75 N.W. 735 (1898). Minnesota was the first
state in America to adopt the doctrine. (3) Four sepa-
rate annotations in the American Law Reports, each of
which is entitled "Attractive Nuisances." (4) Twelve
sections in American Jurisprudence all of which are lo-
cated in a chapter headed "Attractive Nuisances."
For a while, the Virginia cases seemed to have de-
veloped a rule of their own hnown as the "dangerous
instrumentalities" rule. The court applied this rule with
the exact same results as would have been true had the
attractive nuisance doctrine been used. Since Virginia in
reality follows the doctrine, it would be a long step to-
ward clarification of the law in Virginia if the court
would expressly admit that the attractive nuisance doc-
trine, with its generally accepted limitations, is the law
of this state and has been for sometime. We need only
make the language of the opinions accord with the re-
sults of the decisions.
